This Spartan delay in responding to an urgent summons has puzzled historians for almost two thousand years. Herodotus stated explicitly that "it was the ninth day of the month, and they [the Spartans] could not take the field until the moon was full," which most historians take to mean that Sparta was celebrating the Carneia and out of piety delayed deployment. Plato, however, claimed that the Spartans arrived too late for the Battle of Marathon because they were delayed by a helot revolt, an uncorroborated theory that has become very popular with modern historians. More recently, W. P Wallace in his article, “Kleomenes, Marathon, the Helots, and Arkadia,” (The Journal of Hellenic Studies, Vol. 74 (1954), pp. 32-35) suggests that King Cleomenes was creating so much anti-Spartan sentiment among the Arkadian cities that the Spartans could not risk deploying their army until King Cleomenes was back in Sparta. In my essay "The Importance of Marathon for Sparta -- and Leonidas," I argue that since the Spartan army was then always commanded by one of her kings and King Cleomenes was either in Arkadia or mad and King Leotychidas was either still on Aegina or discredited that the Spartans needed to select a non-royal commander which in turn required the approval of the Spartan Assembly -- a procedure that took (a finite and predictable amount of) time. (I.e. "after the full moon.")
Yet the
bottom line is that all these theories – helot uprising, Arkadian discontent, or
a crisis in command – are essentially the product of dissatisfaction with the
explanation provided by Herodotus: a religious festival. Before we reach for alternative explanations, however, we ought to admit to ourselves that we know very little about
Spartan religious festivals. Most especially, we do not how they affected the
readiness of the Spartan army. The assumption that a religious festival might
delay departure of the army simply because of pious scruples may be entirely
wrong.
What if,
for example, the Spartan Army was given leave during religious festivals, or
reduced to a skeleton of “duty officers” for each unit? It is certainly normal
for religious festivals, in all cultures over all times, to be family
occasions. Why should Sparta have been any different? The very fact that there is no mention of how
“odd” the Spartans were in this regard suggests that their behavior was conform
to other Greeks and elicited no comment.
A family
holiday in Sparta might have implied that even the young men were exempt from
sleeping in barracks and all men exempt from dining at their messes. Again, the fact that this is not explicitly
mentioned is no evidence that it is not possible. There is no mention of men
being exempt from duty and collective dining to participate in the Olympic Games either, but Spartan athletes were very prominent at the Olympics and they had
to train in Elis for a month before the events just like all the other
competitors. Likewise, Spartan spectators at the Games could not be eating and
sleeping in Sparta while they were at Olympia. In short, the rules about living
in barracks and eating at the messes where for “ordinary” days. The Olympics, war, and, arguably, religious festivals would have been “extraordinary” or “exceptional” days.
We know,
further, that Spartans all had at least one state kleros, and that wealthier
Spartans had more extensive estates.
Without knowing the yield of an acre of land using 5th
Century agricultural methods, I have no way of estimating just how large a
kleros had to be to support a man and his family, and without knowing how large a
kleros had to be, I cannot estimate how many could have been located within easy walking/riding distance of Sparta’s barracks and messes. However, I think
it is fair to say that not all 8,000 – 9,000 kleroi could have been within a
couple-hours reach of the heart of Sparta.
It is far more likely, that many kleros were more than a half-day, even
a day or two, away from Sparta. Some may
even have been located in Messenia, on the far side of Taygetos, or on Kythera. Reaching these estates to check up on things,
and to collect rents, would have taken Spartans away from Sparta for days on
end.
The
requirement to be present in Sparta most of the time, meant that most of the
time the estates were left in the hands of helots, perioikoi overseers or
wives. Yet the fact that Spartiates were
absent from their estates most of the time only reinforces the need to be
present some of the time. Particularly
if Spartiate/Helot relations were as bad as most people make them out
to be, no Spartan could afford to leave his kleros entirely in the hands of his
helots or even perioikoi overseers. It
would have been necessary for Spartiate landlords to periodically visit their estates in order to ensure nothing was so mismanaged as to endanger payment of his syssitia and, if he had sons, agoge fees. If a kleros was left to a wife, the desire to visit periodically
would have been even greater, particularly if there were young children with her.
In
short, Spariates would have periodically travelled to their distant kleros and
while doing so they would have been excused both from their military duties and
exempted from eating at their syssitia.
Probably, any man could apply for leave to go to his estates whenever it
suited him. Possibly, it was traditional for men to go to their estates during
holidays, when men were given leave to be with their families in any case.
For the
wealthier Spartiates from the so-called “better” families, the 400-500 families
that made up Sparta’s elite, the need to visit estates would have been even
more acute than for the poorest with only one kleros. The elite would have had multiple estates to
look after, horse-farms, kennels, orchards etc.
They would have needed to be away from Sparta even more often than the poor. And it was this elite that, at least in the later years of the 5th
Century, occupied most of the positions of authority, power and command in the Spartan
state and army.
What this means is that Pheidippides may have arrived in Sparta when the entire Spartan army was dispersed and the commanders scattered about Lacedaemon on their
distant estates. The ephors would have needed to recall at least the members of
the Gerousia and the officers of the army as well as cancel leave for those
units they wanted to send to the aid of Athens. The ephors could, I suspect, calculate
pretty accurately how long it would take messengers to reach the lochagoi and other
senior officers, and how long they would need call up their troops and get them
ready to march. That time frame alone –
and nothing so impenetrable as piousness, helot revolts, foreign policy
considerations, or even command uncertainties – might have determined the date
the Spartan army marched out to Marathon.
Brilliant, as always.
ReplyDeleteI am not sure though if there is some problem with my browser but I can not access the essay ''The Importance of Marathon for Sparta -- and Leonidas''..I am very curious about it!
Sorry about the link!
ReplyDeleteHere it is again: http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=1372514135668446210#editor/target=post;postID=2244251359531418049
If that doesn't work, you could try "scrolling" back to January 8, 2011, when I posted the article.